Major General George Kitching |
21 Days in Normandy by Angelo Caravaggio - In my previous post I started a review of 21 Days in Normandy which examines the 4th Canadian Armoured Division's battles to close the Falaise Gap in the summer of 1944 and the conduct of the battles by their General, George Kitching.
Operation Totalize, the
attack intended to close the gap, was their first major battle. The innovative
night attack produced a breakthrough.
In the morning the
Canadians paused. Those at the point of the attack wanted to press on but their
commanders refused citing concerns over a planned bombing that could have
endangered them and the need for supporting forces to catch up. There were
massive logistical issues as they were operating on a narrow front creating a
major bottleneck. It is Caravaggio’s opinion that the narrow front was a key
impediment to break out.
Caravaggio further
believes the tanks wanting to advance would have been stopped by German
anti-tank defences but they never tried. The commanders below Kitching did not
know what to do with unexpected success. There can be little doubt that
aggressive German or American leaders would have attacked. There is no evidence
that Kitching was even consulted by subordinate officers on the decision to
stop the advance.
The Canadian Army,
despite a year of fighting in Italy in WW II before the invasion of Normandy,
was not yet ready to exploit success. The direction of Simonds that there be no
holding back in Operation Totalize was not the Canadian army way at that time.
Within the Canadian army
the 4th Division was even less ready.
The officers commanded
by Kitching in the 4 Armd had varied backgrounds and experience. One officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Booth, was to become infamous in Normandy. At least
one fellow officer considered him a poor brigadier before the Normandy
campaign. During the battle Kitching found him asleep and drunk in his tank.
Kitching verbally lashed him but left him in command. Kitching should never
have excused such dereliction of duty and his decision reflects on his ability
to make hard decisions in combat.
During this battle
Kitching was not close enough to the front at the point of breakthrough and
later was too close to the front when he was needed at Division HQ.
In Tractable, the second
battle for the Gap, Kitching was hampered by confusing and shifting and
inappropriate orders from Simonds. It appeared to me Simonds had lost
confidence in Kitching by Simonds’ attempted micro management of the battle.
Considering the problems
with his orders I believe Kitching effectively commanded his division in
Tractable.
In both battles
subordinates let Kitching down. At pivotal moments they were slow to get
underway. At the same time Kitching did not find ways to drive them. He was a
good man but not the man to lead and exploit a break out.
I did appreciate better
that sending an armoured division into its first battle was bound to have
challenges and the division not to be as effective as a more experienced
division.
Of all the Canadian
generals at that time I think only Bert Hoffmeister had the combination of
drive and iniative and sense of battle to have closed the Gap on time. Hoffmeister
was still in Italy.
Caravaggio clearly
admires Kitching and thinks he got a raw deal in Normandy. He finds it hard to
offer than the odd minor criticism of Kitching. The book is an interesting
perspective on the battle, especially with regard to Simonds, but did not
convince me Kitching performed well in the battles to close the Gap. It is difficult for a biographer to be objective, even more challenging when the writer likes his
subject.
I do agree Kitching was
made a scapegoat for the failure to close the gap as expected. He did not lose
the battles. Kitching’s failing was that he did not win them as fast as
commanders above him planned.
The book makes clear
that the other generals in Totalize and Tractable from Simonds through the generals
commanding other divsions such as the Polish Armoured Division had their own
problems and contributed to the perceived lack of success but they were not
replaced. It was easiest to sacrifice Kitching.
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21 Days in Normandy by Angelo Caravaggio
This is really interesting, Bill. It sounds as though this book really does explore this part of the war in more depth, so it's easier for the reader to understand what happened and why. It seems to show, too, the difference between what the high command thinks, or wants, and what those actually carrying out the orders experience.
ReplyDeleteMargot: The book takes a detailed look at a pivotal part of the war for Canada. It is interesting to reflect on the layers of command. I think of a divisional commander as a senior office but above Kitching were the commanders of the Canadian Army and above them the commanders of the combined armies in that area.
DeleteThese two posts are a very interesting look at a part of World War II history and Canadian history. Thanks for sharing all of this.
ReplyDeleteTracyK: Thanks for the comment. I appreciate you found the posts interesting.
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